This paper presents some theoretical assumptions about the cognitive control mechanisms of subjects learning to play a computer game. A simulation model has been developed to investigate these assumptions.
dressmakers to pilots. It was the aim of the study reported in this paper to get hints and derive hypotheses for generating an adaptive cognitive model of this kind of tasks. Thus, the model should be able to benefit from instructions and to improve during exercises. During the first cognitive phase of skill acquisition, instructions may either be externally communicated as declarative knowledge from manuals or learned from an instructor, or they may be generated by the subjects themselves by reasoning and analogies to well known task conditions (Rasmussen, 1986) . Instructions form a set of rules for particular actions to be executed at certain conditions. In cognitive control of dynamic, real-time tasks, like driving a car or playing a computer game, a particular condition will often be characterised by some immediately perceivable cues, explicated as a part of the instruction.
Hereby, a complex sequence of actions can be structured as sequential sub-tasks, each related to perceptually specified time-space ranges of the overall task.
Consequently, a model of rule governed task optimisation should be able to explore the environmental constraints of the individual subtasks, while the rule structure keeps the overall task composition synchronized with the changing time-spaces.
Representation of the Task Environment
The Task
We used a commercial Commodore computer game, modified to run on a DOS-PC, and integrated it with a cognitive model module written in C. The game presents the player with the task of getting a gymnast to make a graceful vault over a horse (see Figure 1) . A successful triple somersault gives the maximum score of ten points . The game offers a good and instant visual feedback and the screenplay looks like most people have seen it in TV-transmissions of gymnastics. The player is, therefore, immediately attuned to the challenges of the situation.
The timing skills needed in order to master the game reasonably well are quite extensive. First of all the player must learn to let the gymnast perform a good offset from the floor by pressing the joystick button approximately 400 ms after it was initially released. If the button is pressed too late (after 500 ms) or too early (before 200 ms), the gymnast will miss the springboard and come to a halt. The next thing to be learned is to straighten up the gymnast and land her on her feet by pulling the joystick back. This action, required after roughly 4000 ms, is timed by careftilly watching the gymnast's terminal orbit and angle. The somersault manoeuvre presupposes that the player pushes the joystick forward before the gymnast has left the horse behind her. As long as the joystick is pushed forward, she remains in the full-tuck position required for fast rotation. However, her rotational speed will not be fast enough unless the player has made a preceding, precisely timed button press to push her off from the horse in the right moment. This moment occurs when the gymnast is in a nearly vertical position over the horse, approximately .1700 ms into the game, and it has a duration of about 100 ms only. Ability to comply with this timing demand is a prerequisite for becoming a performer of somersaults.
Initial cue-identification
A detailed analysis of the visual scenes of the game specifies the possible cues releasing stereotypical actions, focusing on the objects of the scene which directly shows what the game "affords" . (Gibson, 1979.; Warren, in press ) in terms of appropriate actions. It is assumed, that human subjects will generate some initial rules regarding the approximate synchronisation of actions from analog reasoning. In the present task -to perform gymnastic horse jumps -this process involves knowledge of basic body-dynamics, gymnastic horse jumping competitions and computer games in general. But it is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the origin of this vast amount of tacit knowledge used in human analogical reasoning. Applying Gibson's (1979) concept of directly perceivable affordances we simply set, that certain action possibilities are revealed by the very presence of particular objects. Gibson (1979) uses the concepts of affordances only with respect to direct perception of the natural environment. Direct perception of an artifact's affordances have been discussed in detail by Norman, 1988 , among others. It is generally emphasised that an artifact, through the appropriate use of constraints, can make it obvious what it is for and how it should be used. This is a virtue of all good design, applied on physical tools (Alexander, 1964 , Papernek 1985 and on interface design (Gaver, 1981; Hansen, 1992, Rasmussen, Pejtersen & Goodstein, in press ) . In this way, the cognitive process behind the scene recognition and feature formation are excluded from our model. Recently, similar approaches to cognitive modeling of computer game skills have been taken by . Chapman (1991) , Kirlik, Miller & Jagacinski, (1993a, b) . Figure 1 shows six easily recognisable objects which the player will see on the screen at the start of a game. Object 1, the gymnastics girl, affords human-like actions. Object 2, the running track, affords running and jump-off. Object 3, the springboard, affords amplification of the spring power. Object 4, the horse, affords push-off. Object 5, the landing floor, affords landings. Object 6, the score display, affords performance feedback.
Initial action-identification:
The correct types of actions in terms of button push and joystick showed that unaided subjects had great difficulty in learning the correct type of actions (Hansen, Lervborg & Rasmussen, 1990) . This indicates that the mapping from body dynamics of the gymnastics girl to joystick movements is by no means as straightforward as might have been expected. As a consequence, a group experiment with 23 subjects used for the validation of the model performance was carried out with precise instructions about the type of movements to be learned in each new session. Figure 2 shows the location of the various actions about which the 23 subjects were instructed. During the first one hour learning session, they were told to press the joystick button starting the run at 1), to push the button again at 2) for a jump up to the springboard, to pull the joystick downwards to make the gymnast stretch out for a landing at 5), and to correct unstable landings by a joystick movement opposite a step at 6). In learning session two, the subject were instructed to try out a twist manoeuvre by moving the joystick sideways in the area indicated by 3). In learning session three they were told about the possibility of pushing the girl off the horse at 4) to get her high up in the air. Session four introduced the manoeuvres necessary for carrying 
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out somersaults at position 5). There were no additional instructions for the fifth and final session which was a free play session, where the subjects could demonstrate their skills (Hansen, Lovborg and Rasmussen, 1990 ).
The next section will describe how the cues identified were represented in the model and how the associated actions were instilled in it.
Model Implementations of Cue-Action Rules
Without information on the approximate synchronisation time-spaces given by the visual objects, the model would be functionally "blind".
The information interface between the model and the game is the sprite numbers that governs the visible update of the girls position and manoeuvres on the static background. So, running on the track, for example, may be uniquely characterised by a string of numbers (i.e. from 3 to 13), and no pattern recognition of the visual scene is needed.
The model executes an action by exporting a specific joystick number to the main game module, which specifies e.g. a movement to the left side or a button push. Thus, the simple form of a cue-action rule is:
To activate this rule means to execute a button push which will make the girl jump up to the springboard while she is running. Notice that the string of sprite numbers is a broad indication of the time-space range, while the individual action is precisely defined. In order to allow for optimisation mechanisms to work, the "broadness" of the cueing interval was represented in a more complex way in the actual implementation, as will be described in the next section .
A complete trial can be executed by five cue-action rules of this principal form, which initiate a take-off action, a twist action, a push-off action, a rotate action and a landing action. However, corrections of unstable landings as a result of slightly imprecise executions of the landing action require a six rule, which where implemented once for all learning sessions. The releasing cue of this rule was one of the two sprite numbers being applied when the unbalanced girl takes a step forwards or backwards.
Optimisation of performance
Once the initial instruction had generated a basic synchronisation scheme in terms of the approximate timing and types of actions, the model would optimise movements conducted through the following trials, fitting its "motor program" to the narrow time constraints of the game. This approach is in accordance with the generally accepted conception that skill-demanding acts are preselected subroutines that run off automatically, and that feedback from the environment while a skill is performed mostly serves synchronisation and coordination purposes (Robb, 1972 , Rasmussen, 1986 , Colley & Beech, 1989 .
Within any single training session the model selected among a restricted cue range the most efficient point for the release of a fixed action. Between the sessions, the action repertoire of model was improved by adding new response potentials to its set of cue-action rules. However, it did not by itself discover new types of actions, it only optimised on a fixed set (see below).
In order to select efficient response times and reject inefficient ones the model needs feedback, and to increase the probability of correct responses with practice a decreased stochastic variation on its performance will be needed. The next sections describes how these two functions were implemented.
Model implementation of optimisation functions
Feedback^ The scoring achieved for each trial was the feedback on the basis of which a hill climbing algorithm optimised the model's The interpretation of ν shown in (2) is the total cue-action rule set used for all of the training sessions. However, it was only in the last two sessions (session 4 and 5), that all of the v's had a sprite number identified. In this simple way, the same 5-vector could be used throughout the simulations, gradually increasing the models functionality as it was given new "visual" cues to act on.
The 23 subjects in the original training experiment (see Hansen et al., 1990) Surprisingly, this small difference had a significant effect on the learning trajectories of the simulated players, which will be discussed in the next section.
The scoring rules of the game allow for some variation in the timing of actions. Even though the timing constraints can be as narrow as 150 milliseconds, this covers a wide range of sprites. Furthermore, we did not know the precise sprites shown for a given action interval.
Therefore the cue-action rules of the model were designed to fire if the particular sprite number of the ν vector fell within an approximate interval, defined individually for each of the five different actions. In general terms, the intervals resemble the loci of synchronisations while the changes of the specific ν values within the intervals -governed by the hill climbing algorithm -resemble the optimisation process.
Decreased stochastic variation.
A stochastic variation of the time precision by which a planned action could be executed was decreased as a function of practice in each learning session. By the end of the 64 trials in a session, this stochastic variation would be at a minimum for the newly learned action type, modeling the residual noise from the tremors in body parts and a minimum reaction time. In the following sessions, previously learned actions were then carried out with this minimum variation. The variation function worked on the g integers of formula (2). Figure 3 shows the learning effect of the hill climbing algorithm and the decreased stochastic variation on the score development for 4 improvement for three players from session 1 to 2 and for two players from session 2 to 3. In session 4, the immediate effect of a new action rule were negative, and it typically took one block (16 trials) to retrieve the performance level of the last block in the previous session. been conducted in order to trace the root of this decrease. Figure 6 reveals that two of the simulated players were responsible, namely player 1 and 2.
Results
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Learning Pattern of 4 Simulated Players The fact that the two "realistic" simulated players also exhibited a decrease in performance from session 3 to 4, similar to the decrease found for the majority of real subjects, reflects the objective constraints of the task. The decrease in performance is due to an increase in crash landings, drastically reducing the score by 3 points, when the execution of somersaults interferes with the timing of the landings.
General discussion
Within a general taxonomy for cognitive work analysis (Rasmussen, 1986) Table 1 describes the means-ends relations of the computer game as a work domain. At the present stage of our project, the model simulates the empirical findings highlighted in italics (Hansen et αι., 1990) .
On the top level, the importance of a specific action goal was revealed experimentally by shifting from a learning situation to a Table 1 The means-ends relations of the gymnastics game and empirical findings from Hansen et al., (1990) competitive situation between session 4 and 5. This was found to have a major impact on the 23 subjects' choice of action strategies, as witnessed by the fact that eight of the subjects tried out a more difficult strategy than the one they had mastered during the learning phase, while four subjects resorted to a more trivial performance (Hansen et αι., 1990) . The possible shift of goals and strategies cannot be modeled at the present stage of development of our simulator, because it involves dynamic modifications among priorities, and this in turn requires a high level rule base administrator not yet implemented.
At the level of abstract functions and priority measures, the model demonstrates psychologically plausible reactions to instructions, similar to those given during the original learning experiment, cf. the previous sections of this paper.
Modeling the choice of cue-action strategies at the level of general functions calls for a profound knowledge of the rules actually applied during the experiments. A lot of these rules will be of an idiosyncratic, ad hoc nature and may not even be verbalised by the subjects (see e.g.
. Sudnow, 1983 , or .Chapman, 1991 , for introspective descriptions of cue-action rule formations during computer game learning). After each of the trial-blocks in the original experiment a few of the rules generated in an ad hoc fashion by the 23 subjects were elicited by a post-session questionnaire. The rules regarded the optimal timing of certain actions in terms of cues releasing them. It was found that most of the 23 subjects formed correct rules, i.e. in accordance with the objective time constraints of the game. But a few subjects stated slightly inefficient rules, e.g. about the optimal point to hit the springboard. However, the performances of the latter were not significantly inferior as compared with those of the others. This fact led us to speculate, whether the inefficient rules were post hoc rationalisations or whether they had actually been guiding the performance, but neutralised by noise at a low psycho-physiological level (Hansen et al., 1990) . The model artifact described above indicates that false perceptions can actually be neutralised by the large (Hansen et al., 1990) . We believe that people actively seek feedback on their performance in terms of scores obtained. But in addition to the "trial-and-regret-fiinction" of our hill-climbing algorithm (some) human subjects may also use a "positive self-reinforcement" on efficient behaviour to stabilise the movement patterns that turned out to be particular successful. After the last session of the group experiment, where subjects had to compete for the highest average score, we asked them to estimate what average score they had obtained. Nine of the 23 subjects made a considerable overestimation while the rest came quite close to their actual score. This gives a total average estimation at 5.94 while the actual total average score was 5.22.
Instead of rejecting this result as an example of subjects being ostentatious, we analysed the eye movement patterns of a subject playing 240 games to find further indications of a success bias. He turned out to be very restricted in his attention to the score obtained after each jump. The average of the scores he looked at were 5.11 while the average of all 240 jumps was 4.00. This selective attention may reflect the positive self-reinforcement.
In general, the approach suggested in this paper raises the question of what the proper object of this type of cognitive modeling is: the constraints of the work domain being explored by search and optimisation mechanisms within a hierarchy of goal levels or complex psychological phenomena interacting in idiosyncratic fashions. The framework of this discussion was set by . Simon (1969) Simon argued that the same statement holds true for humans as behaving systems. In the present simulation experiment, the learning pattern in figure 4 and 5 is an example of a behaviour trajectory. The decrease in performance from session 3 to 4 was due to an increase in the rule complexity of the work domain, which was not yet met with the required timing of skills. The fact that humans and the nonconscious automaton react to this increase of complexity in similar ways illustrates how changes in the functional environment influences resource-limited behaviour, no matter how the subjects might have interpreted the task. Thus, modeling cognitive control in domains with consistent constraints like the gymnastics game first and foremost calls for a profound representation of the task. If not, behaviour patterns reflecting the environmental structure may easily be mistaken as evidence of some (new) psychological phenomena (see also Kirlik, Miller & Jagacinski, 1993a ).
Summary and perspective
To develop cognitive models of performance in actual work context to a state of perfection which permits computational verification is a very ambitious and at present an unrealistic aim. Our goal in this paper has been to sketch an evolutionary approach to development of such a model, based on simplifications with respect to the initial 'work At the present state of our project, the model is a learning automaton, capable of responding to instruction-like input information.
It explores the constraints of the work domain by searching within some pre-defined synchronisation areas for the optimal point of action on the basis of the feedback provided from previous trials. Hereby, the model produces learning trajectories which, on a gross level, -are comparable with those of real subjects under identical task conditions.
As such, the present model can serve as a foundation of new improvements. The experiment reported here demonstrates that the automaton is able to synchronise to an explicitly given rule-set for a simple jump and to optimise the timing by a trial-and-error hill climbing strategy.
Analysis of limits and error properties of a cognitive model like the one presented can be a useful tool for testing the effects of instructions given during a training program and for examining whether the rules that can be derived from the directly perceivable affordances of the task scenario will be sufficient information for learning to cope successfully with a new task. As an example, we will use parts of the basic cognitive architecture and adaptation mechanisms described in this article to perform man-in-the-loop simulations within the maritime domain. The cognitive model is to control a ship simulator during a sequence of complex manoeuvrings passing a large bridge. The purpose is to make risk sensitivity analyses with regard to different environmental conditions at increasing levels of difficulties caused by wind and current changes. By precise descriptions of the navigation procedures involved in terms of timing constraints and synchronisations it is our intention to analyse the effects of various task distributions related to the bridge manning and the effects of different configurations of navigational aids.
